PEMINGGIR KOTA

Kebangkitan Rakyat: Bagaimana Gerakan Islam?

KEBANGKITAN RAKYAT: HALUAN DAN CABARAN GERAKAN ISLAM

Haris Zulkapli

Penganalisis Politik Antarabangsa

Kebangkitan Gerakan Islam Era Kebangkitan

Sejak tercetus kebangkitan yang membawa kepada kejatuhan pemerintah republik Tunisia, dunia Islam, terutama rantau Afrika Utara dan Asia Barat menjadi perhatian masyarakat dunia. Bersama perkembangan ini, kemunculan dan kemenangan parti-parti berideologi Islam dalam arena politik dan pilihan raya juga mencetuskan satu minat baharu terhadap gerakan Islam dan parti berasas Islam.

Satu konsensus kelihatan dicapai di media Barat dan dalam kalangan pemerhati, melibatkan haluan baharu kumpulan politik Islam. Satu pendekatan yang disifatkan moderat dan lebih liberal dikemukakan sebagai haluan yang tidak dapat dielakkan daripada diambil oleh parti-parti berasas Islam. Wacana agak dominan kebelakangan ini – yang boleh disifatkan sebagai era “pasca-911” atau “zaman teror” meletakkan beban kepada gerakan Islam untuk bersikap “moderat.”

Kebangkitan Pasca-Islamisme

Satu pendekatan, wacana dan fasa yang dinamakan pasca-Islamisme dicetuskan oleh pengkaji gerakan Islam Asef Bayat semakin mendapat perhatian baharu dan menerima penilaian yang lebih mendalam. Asef mentakrifkan pasca-Islamisme dengan penjelasan berikut: “By ‘post-Islamism’ I mean a condition where, following a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters.” Asef dalam satu rencana pada awal tercetus kebangkitan di seluruh dunia Arab-Afrika menegaskan bagaimana tesis pasca-Islamisme yang dicetuskan kini kelihatan terlaksana, dan bakal menjadi satu ciri penting perkembangan politik di wilayah tersebut.

Wacana pasca-Islamisme ini mengiringi tesis “kegagalan Islam politik” yang dibawa oleh Olivier Roy, pengkaji Islam politik dari Perancis dalam bukunya, The Failure of Political Islam. Beberapa parti yang dilihat mencapai kejayaan dalam sistem politik demokrasi seperti Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan (AKP) di Turki, Parti Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) di Indonesia, Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan di Maghribi dan Parti Wasat, pecahan daripada gerakan Ikhwan al-Muslimin di Mesir disifatkan sebagai parti pasca-Islamis. Kebanyakan parti selain AKP – yang dikemukakan sebagai model pasca-Islamisme paling berjaya – mengambil pendekatan terpilih pasca-Islamisme dan/atau hanya sebahagian ahli parti yang memilih pendekatan tersebut.

Di Malaysia, PAS sebagai contoh menunjukkan beberapa pendekatan pasca-Islamisme, walaupun wacana dalaman berkaitan hal ini masih berjalan dan belum wujud satu konsensus. Fokus terhadap “negara Islam” dan isu seperti pelaksanaan syariah kelihatan diambil tempatnya oleh isu pentadbiran yang bersih, politik dalam masyarakat plural dan isu kehidupan harian lain. Satu perkembangan terkini ialah keputusan PAS mengemukakan gagasan “negara berkebajikan” yang merupakan penyampaian ide berasaskan Islam PAS dalam bahasa mudah difahami orang ramai.

Peluang Dan Cabaran Kebangkitan Rakyat

Dalam sistem politik demokrasi, parti-parti Islam tidak dapat mengelak daripada terkesan dan memberi kesan kepada perkembangan politik global hari ini yang menyaksikan populisme yang semakin meningkat dan berleluasa. Dari Maghribi hingga ke Malaysia, trend semasa kebangkitan rakyat menyajikan peluang dan cabaran yang besar. Sentimen rakyat terbanyak yang semakin sedar hak menolak parti-parti politik termasuk gerakan Islam ke kedudukan kepimpinan, dan pada masa sama tertakluk kepada sentimen ramai. Sifir untung-rugi politik dan pelbagai cabaran lain muncul di hadapan dan tengah-tengah jalan yang dilalui gerakan Islam.

Pada masa sama, wacana menyorot gerakan Islam cenderung mengambil pendekatan yang sangat bersifat dan berkaitan dengan keselamatan (security-centric), sehingga gerakan Islam sentiasa dibayangi oleh al-Qaeda dan gerakan-gerakan yang bukan dalam arus perdana wacana Islam. Bertolak dari sinilah, wacana yang sering berbau apologetik muncul dari dalam gerakan Islam sendiri, walaupun wacana seperti ini bukanlah sesuatu yang baharu. Istilah-istilah seperti “hadhari,” “wasatiyyah” dan “PAS baharu” merupakan antara variasi wacana untuk mengemukakan wajah Islam yang lebih mudah diterima para skeptik. Tekanan memunculkan wajah dilihat sebagai moderat ini malah mendorong pemerintah yang tidak beridentiti gerakan Islam mengemukakan wacana balas terhadap wacana negatif berhubung Islam dengan membawa ide wasatiyyah seperti dilakukan pemerintah Malaysia.

Tekanan Mengubah Haluan

Penilaian rapat dan kritikal banyak pihak terhadap gerakan Islam menjadi satu tekanan untuk memilih haluan atau tindakan tertentu, termasuk pendekatan yang lebih “moderat” atau juga disifatkan sebagai pasca-Islamisme. Menurut pencetus ide ini, sesebuah gerakan Islam boleh sahaja memilih pendekatan pasca-Islamisme tetapi bukan secara keseluruhan. Tetapi, tegasnya, haluan ini semakin menjadi satu realiti dalam dunia gerakan Islam seluruh dunia. Era kebangkitan rakyat membawa bersama populisme yang mencabar. Tindakan, kenyataan dan dasar yang berasaskan perkiraan populariti membuka risiko mendesak gerakan Islam memilih haluan yang berpotensi mencetus masalah, terutama pada masa depan. Apa yang dibawa oleh ide pasca-Islamisme bukanlah semata-mata negatif dan bertentangan dengan pegangan gerakan Islam, sebagai contoh ide “negara berkebajikan” dan nilai-nilai Islam yang disebut dalam bahasa difahami orang ramai sebagai tujuan menyampaikan dakwah.

Walau bagaimanapun, tekanan hasil pemerhatian dan penilaian banyak pihak, ditambah tuntutan politik populis dalam era kebangkitan rakyat pada masa kini boleh mendorong gerakan Islam mengambil tindakan bukan berdasarkan pemikiran mendalam dan dengan asas yang jelas. Hal ini juga membuka risiko gerakan Islam dilihat oportunis dan tidak mempunyai pandangan yang tetap, sebahagiannya disebabkan oleh perbezaan pandangan dalaman antara pelbagai kumpulan dalam sebuah gerakan Islam.

Kesimpulan

Era kebangkitan rakyat pada masa ini menyediakan pelbagai peluang tetapi tidak kurang juga cabaran yang menyentuh asas fundamental gerakan Islam. Perkembangan politik semasa perlu ditangani dengan cermat dan dengan pemikiran yang jelas dan mendalam oleh gerakan Islam supaya tidak terdorong memilih haluan yang bermasalah. Tanpa pemikiran yang mendalam, pendekatan yang dikemukakan sebagai moderat berkecenderungan untuk kelihatan dan muncul dalam penilaian sejarah pada masa depan sebagai tindakan oportunis semata-mata. Populisme semata-mata tidak sepatutnya menjadi sandaran dan modal utama gerakan Islam, yang identiti utama dan misi utamanya bukan matlamat politik dan kuasa semata-mata. Sebagai salah satu pemimpin dan ikutan umat, setiap tindakan perlu didasari asas intelektual dan moral yang jelas.

**Haris Zalkapli merupakan seorang jurnalis, penganalisis politik negara dan antarabangsa, pengkaji budaya politik pop dan penulis tamu. Pernah menjawat jawatan sebagai pengarang di bahagian rencana akhbar Harakah. Kini bertugas di unit buku Harakah. Mengeluarkan karya terbaru belia berjudul “Revolusi Global, Dunia dalam Era Kebangkitan Rakyat”. Buah fikiran beliau dapat diikuti di http://www.politikpop.com.

Pengajaran Arab-Spring: Nazrah dan Analisis Generasi Muda

PENGAJARAN DARIPADA ARAB SPRING :
NAZRAH DAN ANALISIS GENERASI MUDA

Jufitri Joha

Naib Presiden Antarabangsa ABIM

Robert Bowker, Profesor di Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University (ANU) memberikan satu analisis yang menarik ketika penulis menghadiri syarahan beliau berkenaan Arab Spring di ANU. Saya menjangkakan beliau akan memberikan analisa berkenaan dengan sebab berlakunya Arab Spring khususnya di Mesir namun jangkaan saya meleset apabila beliau lebih kepada membuat analisa yang mendalam dan menarik berkenaan pasca Arab Spring di Mesir.

Profesor Bowker menyebutkan bahawa Indonesia dan Turki memberikan pengajaran yang menarik kepada dunia Arab tentang perubahan dari pemerintahan autokratik tentera kepada pemerintahan sivil yang lebih demokratik. Walaupun pengajaran ini sudah terhidang kepada mereka hampir sepuluh tahun namun pemerintah Arab gagal mengambil iktibar dan ibrah menyebabkan mereka terpaksa mengalami nasih buruk apabila dipaksa mengundur diri secara terhina bermula dengan Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali yang memerintah sejak 1987, Mubarak sejak 1981 dan Gadaffi sejak 1969 manakala keluarga Assad sejak 1970 dan Ali Abdullah Saleh sejak 1978 hanya retak menanti belah. Kebanyakkan pakar Timur Tengah tidak menjangkakan bahawa tentera negara-negara Arab akan bertindak menderhakai ketua mereka yang juga merupakan ketua negara bahkan atas andaian yang salah ini, penganalisa seperti Profesor F.Gregory Gause dari Universiti Vermont mencadangkan agar Amerika Syarikat tidak menggalakkan amalan demokrasi subur di negara-negara Arab kerana ia memberikan masa depan yang stabil untuk hubungan Amerika dengan sekutunya di Timur Tengah.

Arab Spring atau sesetengah penganalisa lebih suka menamakannya sebagai Arab Revolution benar-benar terjadi ketika sebahagian besar aktivitis gerakan Islam tidak meletakkan harapan besar kepada dunia Arab untuk memimpin perubahan dalam dunia Islam. Sebaliknya harapan diletakkan kepada 3 buah negara Islam iaitu Turki, Indonesia dan Malaysia. Namun harapan ini telah terbuka luas dengan terjadinya Arab Spring yang merupakan satu lembaran sejarah kepada dunia Islam khususnya landskap politik Timur Tengah. Namun persoalan timbul sama ada perubahan ini merupakan suatu perubahan yang didasari semata-mata perubahan politik atau turut melibatkan perubahan sosial yang berbentuk keagamaan? Walaupun ramai penganalisa lebih cenderung menyatakan ianya lebih kepada perubahan bersifat politik namun saya berpandangan ia turut melibatkan perubahan yang menuntut kepada negara Mesir yang lebih demokratik dan Islamik.

Walaupun Ikhwanul Muslimin bukanlah aktor utama kepada perubahan ini kerana ia menurut Dr. Max Lane dari Asia Institute, University of Melbourne merupakan ‘Leaderless Revolution’, namun kesedaran yang berteraskan agama kepada perubahan sudah dirintis oleh pertubuhan berpengaruh ini semenjak 4 tahun selepas kejatuhan sistem khalifah pada 1924. Kemuncak kepada kesedaran dan keberanian ini meletus selepas rakyat Mesir mendapat inspirasi dari negara jiran mereka Tunisia yang membawa kepada pengabsahan kepadaa teori domino.

Apa yang membezakan Arab Spring dengan Revolusi Iran 1979 ialah Revolusi Iran bukan sekadar membuat kepada perubahan secara besar-besaran tapi mereka bersedia untuk mengisi perubahan. Namun sayangnya Mesir, Tunisia dan Libya nampaknya kurang bersedia untuk mengurus perubahan tetapi apa yang penting perubahan sudah berlaku. Persoalan demokrasi bertentangan dengan Islam sudah tidak menjadi isu utama kepada dunia Islam namun apa yang lebih penting menurut Profesor Bowker ialah umat Islam telah mula memanfaatkan demokrasi bagi menegakkan perjuangan Islam. Mesir, Tunisia dan Libya harus mempergunakan demokrasi dan kreativiti bagi memacu perubahan bagi membawa keluar warganya dari garisan paras kemiskinan yang diwarisi sebelumnya dan juga menangani pertambahan penduduknya menjelang 2050.

Paling penting dalam mencorakkan perubahan seterusnya, mereka harus bebas dari pengaruh luar khususnya Amerika sebaliknya lebih mandiri dan harus disokong oleh dunia Islam yang kelihatan Turki sedang memainkan sebagai pimpinannya. Profesor Bowker turut menegaskan bahawa pihak luar tidak akan diberikan ruang untuk campur tangan dalam menentukan masa depan pasca Arab Spring yang sedang berlaku di dunia Arab ketika ini. Arab Spring selepas kematian Osama Laden, menurut Profesor Tariq Ramadan akan menyaksikan perubahan yang lebih damai dan tidak akan melibatkan lagi pertumpahan darah dan keganasan seperti telahan beliau, “The Muslim-majority societies have a substantial responsibility for managing their own future. It cannot be stated strongly enough that the sirens of violence and extremism have never seduced the overwhelming majority of their peoples”.

Dua perkara yang menarik perhatian penulis dari Arab Spring ialah bagaimana peranan generasi muda dan ledakan teknologi maklumat banyak membantu dalam perubahan di negara-negara Arab. Dua faktor ini amat penting diberikan perhatian di saat ini kerana ia menjadi perkara utama mendasari kepada perubahan di mana-mana sahaja. Mengambil contoh Wael Ghonim seorang Eksekutif muda Google Mesir yang berpelajaran tinggi dari American University of Cairo telah memimpin perubahan dengan memanfaatkan kecanggihan teknologi maklumat. Bahkan anak muda ini berani mempertaruhkan masa depannya dengan mengendalikan Facebook “We are all Khaled Said”. Ia sempena memperingati Khaled Said yang mati dipukul oleh polis Mesir dan menjadi sumber inspirasi yang utama kepada mobilasi rakyat Mesir untuk turun ke jalanan menentang rejim Mubarak.

Internet khususnya media sosial sudah begitu sinonim dengan generasi muda. Ia perkara yang tidak dapat dipisahkan antara dua entiti ini. Generasi muda mudah mengakses maklumat melalui internet dan mereka sudah tidak lagi berminat kepada media konvensional seperti televisyen dan suratkhabar untuk mendapatkan maklumat yang bersifat sehala. Justeru internet khususnya media sosial menjadi sumber mereka mendapatkan maklumat alternatif dan alat kepada memobilisasikan rakan-rakan sebaya mereka untuk melaksanakan sesuatu agenda. Dari sekecil-kecil agenda peribadi kepada sebesar-besar agenda perubahan demokrasi dimanfaatkan oleh generasi muda melalui saluran ini.

Benarlah kata-kata Tony Benn, bekas Ahli Parlimen Britain dalam tulisannya di New Statemen, “Democracy itself depends on availability of information”. Akses generasi muda kepada maklumat dengan mudah melalui internet boleh membawa kepada perubahan dan amalan demokrasi yang subur. Maklumat yang mereka perolehi daripada media arus perdana diseimbangkan dengan maklumat yang diperolehi dari media alternatif bagi menghasilkan kepada kesimpulan akhir dalam membuat keputusan yang membawa perubahan dalam konteks politik sesebuah negara.

Generasi muda yang juga dikenali Generasi Y atau ‘the Net Generation’ sudah menjadi perhatian kepada mana-mana pihak berkepentingan di dunia ini. Pihak pemerintah, pembangkang dan pelbagai pihak memberikan fokus untuk mendekati dan memenangi hati golongan ini. Ini adalah kepercayaan mereka bahawa generasi muda merupakan tonggak yang amat penting kepada sesuatu perubahan kerana mereka adalah golongan yang kreatif, bertenaga dan sangat mesra internet. Mereka tidak lagi mudah digula-gulakan bahkan mereka bijak untuk membuat pilihan dan perubahan.

Mahu tidak mahu Malaysia juga mengalami sedikit tempias Arab Spring dan pihak-pihak berkepentingan khususnya parti politik harus lebih kreatif dalam memenangi lebih 62 peratus pengundi muda atas pagar (menurut statistik Makmal Pemuda Barisan Nasional) yang bakal menentukan landskap masa depan politik dan demokrasi negara Malaysia yang tercinta.

Secara ringkasnya generasi muda merupakan pemangkin kepada perubahan masa kini dan masa depan. Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab besar kepada kita khususnya ahli masyarakat madani dalam memandu dan mendidik mereka agar perubahan yang dibawa oleh generasi muda ini adalah berpaksikan ilmu dan bukan berdasarkan emosi dan semangat semata-mata.

Sesungguhnya Arab Spring memberikan banyak pengajaran kepada kita, namun sehingga kini dunia masih lagi menggosok-gosokkan mata mereka seolah-olah tidak percaya bahawa perubahan mampu berlaku di dunia Arab sebagai mana masyarakat di zaman Rasulullah tidak yakin Umar akan bertindak memeluk Islam sehinggalah tunggangan Umar dahulu yang masuk Islam.

**Jufitri Joha merupakan seorang aktivis sosial yang kini aktif bersama Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM). Beliau menjawat jawatan sebagai Naib Presiden Antarabangsa ABIM sesi 2011/2013. Beliau juga merupakan pengasas dan pengerusi Grup Penjejak Tamadun Dunia (GPTD), pengasas Kelab Pemikir Muda (Intelectual Youth Club – IYC) Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia dan pengasas Sekolah Pembangunan Kerja Belia. Tulisan dan cetusan rasa beliau boleh dilawati di http://gptd-spain.blogspot.com.

Islamic Movement In Paradox: Between Civil Society & Masyarakat Madani

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN PARADOX:

BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY & MASYARAKAT MADANI (PART 1)

Mohammad Fazril Bin Mohd Saleh

National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students

INTRODUCTION

A society is a basic unit of human civilization and culture, where these two play a vital role. From time immemorial human beings are tied in social relationship to one another. Nowadays social status has taken on a new dimension according to the needs and requirement of the society. The primitive cultures and civilizations are very simple, therefore their society was also simple and now, society becomes more and more complex, apparently its complexity is at its zenith.

Although we live in ‘civilized’ world today with electronic wave system, satellite communications and wonderful devices which are supplying amazing comfort in the terrestrial life, but still we are not in peace. As criticized by Sirajul Islam (2005): “ever imminent war, scarcity of morality, degradation of values, slackening of human rights and so on are peeping in at our doors every moment.” Therefore, we feel the need of ‘civil society’, so that our good life, civilization and culture may be preserved.

Islamic movement all around the world tried their best to champion in this area. However, it is a very urgent need for Islamic movement to understand the very meaning and concept of civil society in order to impart and manifest the idea in their actions. Interestingly, particularly in Malaysia, the debate on this topic has been flourished once led by Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam Malaysia (PKPIM) and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) and a new term which signifies the notion of civil society in their own mold was coined; the concept of ‘Masyarakat Madani’ emerged.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN MAINSTREAM DISCOURSE

The answer to the question, “what is good life?” would lead to the concept of ‘civil society’. But, according to Asha Mukherjee (2005), answering this question satisfactorily needs that we first agrees as to what should be counted as good life. He said, “We find that ‘good life’ has an inbuilt two dimensions, the individualistic as well as social.” Meanwhile, looking on the term ‘civil society’ in the modern perspective, Moten and Islam (2009) mentioned that the term is a peculiarly modern concept which was neglected for most of the 20th century in the West (particularly in the Western Europe), though it was commonly used in Marxist terminology and some of its derivatives and the term became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In contemporary academic exploration, ‘civil society’ as defined by Cohen and Arato (1992), is usually defined to refer to the level of governance between the state and the governed. It includes, but is not limited to, non-government organizations involved in service delivery and advocacy activities, charitable organizations, private foundations, professional associations, social movements and activist networks. As insisted by Helen James, the key common denominator with all these groups is that they be ‘not for profit’, and seek to achieve their objectives through non-violent methods.

Meanwhile for Philip Oxhorn (2007), the civil society expert who focuses his analysis and studies of civil society in Latin America said: “Given the concept’s close association with Western history and political thought, its applicability to other regions such as Latin America is often hotly debated”. Therefore, he defined civil society as ‘the social fabric formed by a multiplicity of self-constituted territorially and functionally-based units which peacefully coexist and collectively resist subordination to the state, at the same time that they demand inclusion into national political structure’.

Even though the concept of civil society has largely flourished from the 18th century (in the time of early modern thought of the ‘Enlightenment’) and onward, but it is not a new concept. Sirajul Islam (2009) proved that the concept of civil society had been expounded in ancient Greece. Plato’s “Republic” offers vivid instances of civil society and justice. Even, Socrates also advised each citizen to maintain civil laws and principles of the society, because, as a good citizen of a particular state, it is his moral obligation to obey the law of his state. However, their civil society was basically confined to the political theory. In “The Republic”, Plato maintained that government, whether it is ruled by the king or the military, the people or the tyrant, should treat society in a reasonable way, as an image of the individual and people will be the sole composer of that regime.

Meanwhile, the ‘social concept’ theory developed by Thomas Hobbes, as mentioned by Michael Goldman (1997), is basically signifies the associations of the people which is the necessary part of the civil society. In his book “Leviathan”, he said: “human beings in the state of nature are determined by the necessity of the mechanics of their bodies to pursue their own good, even at the expense of others and cannot be blamed for pursuing that to which nature impels them.” According to him, human beings come together because they need each other to be complete, also for the social conditions necessary to bring out happiness and fulfillment.

Afterward, as stated by Zaleski and Pawel (1997), Hegel, Toqueville, Marx, and Gramsci, all spoke about civil society in the political or economical sense. Hegel gave rise to a modern liberal understanding of the concept of civil society as a form of market society as opposed to institutions of modern nation state. He considered civil society as a separate realm, a "system of needs", that stood for the satisfaction of individual interests and private property. Hence, he used the German term "burgerliche Gesellschaft" to denote civil society as "civilian society". Then, Alexis de Tocqueville put weight on the system of civilian and political associations as a counterbalance to both liberal individualism and centralization of the state. Hence, Hegel's perception of social reality was followed in general by Tocqueville who distinguished between political society and civil society.

Meanwhile, for Karl Marx, civil society was the ‘base’ where productive forces and social relations were taking place, whereas political society was the 'superstructure'. Agreeing with the link between capitalism and civil society, Marx held that the latter represents the interests of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the state as superstructure also represents the interests of the dominant class; under capitalism, it maintains the domination of the bourgeoisie. Hence, Marx rejected the positive role of state put forth by Hegel. Marx argued that the state cannot be a neutral problem solver. Rather, he depicted the state as the defender of the interests of the bourgeoisie. He considered the state and civil society as the executive arms of the bourgeoisie; therefore, “both should wither away”.

On the other hand, the negative view about civil society raised by Marx was rectified by Antonio Gramsci. He underlined the crucial role of civil society as the contributor of the cultural and ideological capital required for the survival of the hegemony of capitalism. Rather than posing it as a problem, as in earlier Marxist conceptions, Gramsci viewed civil society (societa civile) as the site for problem-solving.

For the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, ‘civil society’ is a concept located strategically at the cross-section of important strands of intellectual developments in the discipline of social sciences. To take account of the diversity of the concept, they adopted an initial working definition that is meant to guide research activities and teaching, but are by no means to be interpreted as a rigid statement: “Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated.

Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group.”

Examples of civil society institutions are: (1) non-governmental organizations (NGOs), (2) private voluntary organizations (PVOs), (3) peoples’ organizations, (4) community-based organizations, (4) civic clubs, (5) trade unions, (6) gender, cultural, and religious groups, (7) charities, (8) social and sports clubs, (9) cooperatives, (10) environmental groups, (11) professional associations, (12) academia, (13) policy institutions, (14) consumers/consumer organizations, (15) the media, (16) citizens' militia, and (17) organized religion. Moten and Islam argued that civil society is not the exclusive domain of one country or continent, or of a particular type of political system. Almost all societies have within them civil formations regardless of the system of government.

According to Larry Diamond, the organizations of civil society are voluntary, self-generating, autonomous, and rule abiding. They are concerned with the public ends; they relate to the state without seeking office; they encompass pluralism; and they are partial. Moten and Islam had elaborated beautifully those characteristics of civil society given by Larry Diamond. They explained six characteristics of civil society, summarized as follow: (1) Voluntary and autonomous, (2) public ends, (3) pluralism and diversity, (4) partial and non-holistic, (5) link with the state, and (6) civility.

[End of Part 1] To be continued.

References:

al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib Prolegomena to The Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of The Fundamental Elements of The Worldview of Islam, Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995.

Goldman, Michael (ed.), Journal of Teaching Philosophy, USA: Miami University, 1997, edition. 20:2, June.

James, Helen. (ed.) Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance: Paradigms of Power and Persuasion, London & NY: Routledge, 2007.

Madjid, Nurcholish “Introduction to Civil Society and Democratic Investment: Challenges and Opportunities”, Civil Society versus Civilised Society: Archeology of the Notion of “Civil Society” in Islam Indonesia, ed. by Ahmad Baso, Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999

Miller, David The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought, London: Blackwell, 1994.

Moten, Islam. Introduction to Political Science 3^rd Edition, Singapore: Cengage Learning Asia, 2009.

Zaleski, Pawel. "Tocqueville on Civilian Society. A Romantic Vision of the Dichotomic Structure of Social Reality", Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte, Germany: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008.

Twilight of Majesty: Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri

TWILIGHT OF MAJESTY: AL-ASHRAF QANSUH AL-GHAWRI

SULTAN OF THE FALLEN MAMLUK DYNASTY

By:

Mohammad Fazril Bin Mohd Saleh

International Islamic University Malaysia

INTRODUCTION

Phillip K. Hitti in 1937 typified the opinion of scholars of Arabs contemporary with him about the legacy of the Mamluk:

Mamluk Egypt began its history under proud and triumphant rulers who had cleared Syria of the last vestiges of Frankish dominion and had successfully stood between the Mongols and world power. By the end of the period, however, with its military oligarchy, factions among the dominant caste, debased coinage, high taxation, insecurity of life and property, occasional plague and famine and frequent revolts, both Egypt and its dependency Syria were all but ruined.[1]

Based on Hitti’s statement above, I suggest that he tried to draw the cause of the fallen of Mamluk’s dominion during the end reign of their period especially in Egypt and Levant.

One of the most significant figures during this era was Al-Ashraf Qansuh Al-Ghawri (1501-1516 BC) who was the second last ruler of the dynasty prior to Tuman Bey II. Starting from the era prior to his elevation to the autocracy, a skeletal-brief outline of the life and reign of Al-Ashraf Qansuh Al-Ghawri will be presented throughout this paper. This paper consists of five sub-topics excluding the Introduction: Historical Background: Emergence of Mamluk’s Superiority which an effort of reconstructing briefly the major events happened in Mamluk’s chronicles; Qansuh Al-Ghawri: Twilight of Majesty is the skeletal introductory to Qansuh al-Ghawry that outlined the life of the sultan and what has been done by him during his reign; Ottoman-Safavid Dispute: Intrusion of Mamluk’s Territory tries to give a brief picture of the battle of Chaldiran 1514 between the Ottoman Empire and Safawi Empire of Persia which forced the Mamluk to take certain considerations reluctantly; and finally before the conclusion, the end of Al-Ghawry’s reign indicated by his lose at Marj Dabiq as explained in Lose At Marj Dabiq: The Fall of Mamluk Sultanate.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EMERGENCE OF MAMLUK’S SUPERIORITY

Mamluk Egypt began its history under proud and triumphant rulers who had cleared Syria of the last vestiges of Frankish dominion and had successfully stood between the Mongols and world power. Undeniably, Mamluk was a very able, strong, talented group of troops as the has been acknowledged famously beat back the Mongols at the Battle of Ain Jalut (1260 AD) and fought the Crusaders effectively driving them out from the Levant by 1291 AD and officially in 1302 AD ending the era of the Crusades. From the 8^th to the 16^th century, Mamluks formed the core of most Muslim armies.[2]

According to The Columbia Encyclopaedia Sixth Edition (2008), Mamluk or Mameluke, which literary means slave in Arabic, is a warrior caste dominant in Egypt and influential in the Middle East for over 700 years. Islamic rulers created this warrior caste by collecting non-Muslim slave boys and training them as cavalry soldiers especially loyal to their owner and each other. They converted to Islam in the course of their training.[3]

In the very beginning, Mamluk was a slave who been trained intensively to be a very able soldier. According to Thomas F. Madden, predominantly, most of these Mamluks were Kipchaks.[4] Kipchaks were a Turkic tribal confederation that originating in the Kimek Khanate that conquered large parts of the Eurasian steppe during the Turkic expansion of the 11th to 12th centuries together with the Cumans.[5] Usually historians divided Mamluk history into two periods based on different dynastic lines: the Bahri Mamluks (1250–1382) of Kipchaks Turkic origin from southern Russia, named after the location of their barracks on the Nile (al-bahr, literally "the sea," a name given to this great river), and the Burji Mamluks (1382–1517) of Caucasian Circassian origin, who were quartered in the citadel (al-burj, literally "the tower"). After receiving instruction in Arabic, the fundamentals of Islam, and the art of warfare, slaves in the royal barracks were manumitted and given responsibilities in the Mamluk hierarchy.[6]

Unlike the Mamluk, local non-mamluk warriors were often more loyal to their tribal sheikhs, their families, or nobles than to the sultan or caliph. If a commander conspired against the ruler, it was often not possible to deal with the conspiracy without causing unrest among the nobility. The mamluk slave-troops were strangers of the lowest possible status who could not conspire against the ruler and who could easily be punished if they caused trouble, making them a great military asset. Nonetheless, the untie nature of the Mamluk was also the factor why they were daring to topple down their master in certain conditions. Under Saladin and the Ayyubids of Egypt, the power of the mamluks increased until they claimed the sultanate in 1250, ruling as the Mamluk Sultanate.

The Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt was established in 1250 AD, after the death of al-Muazzam Turanshah, the descendant of Sultan al-Salih Ayyub, which signified the end of Ayyubid Dynasty. From the first significant figure ruled, Izz al-Din Aybak (r. 1250-1257 AD), the Mamluk Sultanate has became great political importance and was long-lived, lasting from the 9^th to the 19^th century AD. It lasted under the reign of Tuman Bey II in 1517 after being defeated by the Ottoman forces in the battle of Ridaniya.[7] Culturally, the Mamluk period is known mainly for its achievements in historical writing and in architecture and for an abortive attempt at socio-religious reform. Mamluk historians were prolific chroniclers, biographers, and encyclopaedists; As builders of religious edifices; mosques, schools, monasteries and, above all, tomb, the Mamluks endowed Cairo with some of its most impressive monuments, many of which are still standing; the Mamluk tomb-mosques can be recognized by stone domes whose massiveness is offset by geometrical carvings.[8]

QANSUH AL-GHAWRI: TWILIGHT OF MAJESTY

Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri was among the most significant figures in the history of Egypt’s Mamluk. He was the second last sultan, ruled from 1501 to 1516 BC. He was the one who fought Ottoman Empire in the battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 BC. He died in the battle field. In 1501, he became sultan in the age of over 60 years. He was a strong man and a shrewed ruler. According to Michael Winter, Al-Ghawri’s reign brought stability to Mamluk’s politics after five tumultuous years and four weak sultans, following the stable period of Qaytbay.[9] Meanwhile, Dean Richardson put Al-Ghawri as:

Sixty years old when he became the penultimate Mamluke sultan in 1500, Qansuh al-Ghuri remained vigorous into his seventies, playing polo, writing poetry and discoursing with sufis – not forgetting the traditional pursuits like building, intrigue and arbitrary justice.”[10]

Inevitably, Al-Ghawri was often compared with Al-Ashraf Qaytbay and was found wanting. Ibn Ilyas, who was the most prolific chronicler during that period described; where Qaytbay was considered “majestic, serene, and dignified, correct in decorum, invariably respected, projecting an aura of majesty”, al-Ghawri is described by Ibn Ilyas as an unjust, stingy and greedy despot.[11] However, Michael Winter backing up al-Ghawri:

He was a bon vivant, cultured and talented, but according to Ibn Ilyas, who certainly represents the public opinion of Cairo, “each year of his reign weighed down on the people like thousand years and his defects outweighed his positive traits.” Yet, it must be remembered that al-Ghawri had to face formidable domestic difficulties and foreign threat. He combined caution with originality and imagination and tried to save the empire.[12]

Before his enthronement, this obscure officer only in passing as a provincial governor who crushed local insurgents and repelled invaders from outside. Al-Ghawri, who took his title from the Ghawr Barracks of Cairo where he was trained, was designated an amir of ten in 1484 BC upon his completion of service in the Ottoman campaign on that year.[13] As Circassian slave, he had served Sultan Al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qaytbay; was over forty before he was raised to independence as Emir of ten; and then, rapidly promoted to command of Tarsus, Aleppo and Malatia, he became Emir of a thousand, Chamberlain of the Court, and chief Vizier. During the feuds that erupted the interregnum following Qaytbay’s death, al-Ghawri emerged from the group of contenders for the imperial office.[14] At first he declined the throne; but being pressed by the Emirs, who swore faithful service, he at last consented.[15]

According to almost all scholars of Mamluk history, Qansuh al-Ghawri exhibited little regard for hallowed traditions, military or religious. Carl. F. Petry illustrates situation during the reign of Qansuh Al-Ghawry: “Burden by irremedial bankruptcy and endemic sedition, he initiated the first steps toward innovation since the architects of the Mamluk system founded the regime during thirteen century”.[16]

Nevertheless, al-Ghawri has tried his best to maintain the stability of his government and administration. He was the innovator, but the ‘reviled’ one.[17] Might be, the condition and situation at his particular period enforces him to act and took some considerations in certain manner, made some people reviled him. The sultanic throne was ascended by Al-Asyraf Tuman Bay after the defeat of him by Ottoman Sultan Selim I at the Battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 CE.

OTTOMAN-SAFAVID DISPUTE: INTRUSION OF MAMLUK’S TERRITORY

This was the incident which gave the route to the fallen of Mamluk Sultanate. Battle of Chaldiran was the first full battle between the armies of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires occurred in 1514 at Chaldiran, in northwestern Persia. The conflict was caused by a number of factors, including Ottoman persecution of its Qizilbash population in Asia Minor, and expansionist goals of both empires into the others' territory. The Ottoman army, en route to battle the Safavids, arrived at the Plains of Chaldiran in August, 1514. The Safavids attacked the next day, and the ensuing battle had significant consequences for both empires.[18]

The most immediately noticeable factor in the battle was the absolute superiority of the Ottoman army over the Safavids. With many more years - centuries, in fact - of military experience behind them, the Ottomans' 100,000 troops swiftly defeated the Safavids' 40,000. The battle also showcased the effectiveness of new forms of weaponry. The Ottomans, the first Islamic empire to employ artillery in warfare, brought Janissaries armed with muskets, as well as 200 cannons, 100 mortars, and other field artillery to Chaldiran. The Persians, meanwhile, who had no modern weaponry, used the old tactics of cavalry archers. They were soundly defeated. Shah Ismail withdrew his troops after suffering heavy casualties, and the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I, did not pursue him. Selim then marched into Tabriz, the Safavid capital, although his near-mutinous army, who wanted to return home, kept him from staying and taking any more Persian territory.[19]

For The Applied History Research Group of University of Calgary, the outcome at Chaldiran had many consequences. Perhaps most significantly, it established the border between the two empires, which remains the border between Turkey and Iran today. With the establishment of that border, Tabriz became a frontier city, uncomfortably close to the Ottoman enemy. That consideration would be a major factor in the decision to move the Safavid capital to Qazwin, in the mid-16^th century and finally to Isfahan, in central Persia, in 1598. Domestically, Ismail's image in the eyes of his followers was also severely damaged by the Safavid defeat at Chaldiran. The Qizilbash believed deeply in the shah's divinity, and they had trouble reconciling the defeat with their previous view of the shah as invincible. Ismail weathered this crisis, however. A more serious loss of faith in the shah would likely have caused the collapse of the empire, which did not happen. Ismail's father and grandfather had both been killed in battle, and he invoked that fact in persuading his people that he was still a capable and divine leader, despite the defeat at Chaldiran. Personally, however, Ismail was devastated by this, his first defeat, and went into virtual mourning. He never again led his troops into battle personally.[20]

By far the most significant factor in the battle was the Ottoman use of artillery. Without it, military historians have asserted that the battle could have gone either way. The Ottomans had used firepower in warfare since they were introduced to the weapons from Europe in the early 15th century. The Persians had used artillery in small battles with local foes, but had never done so on a large scale by the time of Chaldiran in 1514. Still, the Safavids could have matched the Ottoman firepower had they chosen to do so. They opted against it, however, because they believed that the new weaponry was cowardly, and they had faith in the effectiveness of their cavalry. The Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt held similar views, and they were also defeated by Ottoman firepower three years after Chaldiran.[21]

LOSE AT MARJ DABIQ: THE FALL OF MAMLUK SULTANATE

Throughout the 15^th century, Mamluk Syria continued to decline, while a new power was growing to the north, that of the Ottoman Turkish sultanate in Asia Minor. Having occupied Constantinople and the Balkans, it began to look southward. The Ottoman Sultan Selim I had just vanquished the Persians at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. He then redeployed against the Mamluk, who ruled in Syria and Egypt, in order to complete the Ottoman conquest of the Middle East. The war transformed the Ottoman Empire from a realm at the margin of Islamic lands, mainly located in Anatolia and the Balkans, to a huge Empire encompassing the traditional lands of Islam, including the historical cities of Mecca, Cairo, Damascus and Aleppo. It continued to be ruled however from Constantinople.[22]

The relationship between the Ottomans and the Mamluks had long been adversarial: both states vied for control of the spice trade, and the Ottomans aspired to eventually taking control of the Holy Cities of Islam. An earlier conflict, the Ottoman-Mamluk War (1485-1491) had led to a stalemate. The war consisted of several battles. The Mamluk army was rather traditional, mainly consisting in cavalry using bows and arrows, whereas the Ottoman army, and especially the Janissaries, was quite modern, using arquebus. The Mamluks remained proud in their tradition and tended to disregard the usage of firearms.[23] However, according to Prof. Ataullah Bogdan Kopanski, the Mamluks were upholding the notion that it is forbidden using fire against Muslims, but it is permissible to use fire for the infidels. This might be true as mamluks at that time have had the capability using their special muskets.[24]

In 1516 Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluks in the Battle of Marj Dabiq and occupied the whole of Syria. The Ottomans first captured the city of Diyarbekir in southeastern Anatolia. The Battle of Marj Dabiq (24 August 1516) was decisive, in which Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri was killed. Syria fell under the rule of the Ottomans with this single battle. Although parts of Syria enjoyed some local autonomy, the area as a whole remained for 400 years an integral section of the Ottoman Empire. It was divided into provinces, each under a governor.[25]

The collapse of the sultanate fully happened under the reign of the successor of Qansuh al-Ghawri, Tuman Bey II in 1517 after being defeated by the Ottoman forces in the battle of Ridaniya. Ottoman Empire conquered the whole Egypt and Levant until 1798. The conquest of the Mamluk Empire would also open up the territories of Africa to the Ottomans. During the 16th century, Ottoman power would expand further west of Cairo, along the coasts of Northern Africa. The corsair Hayreddin Barbarossa established a base in Algeria, and later accomplished the Conquest of Tunis in 1534. Cairo would remain in Ottoman hands until the 1798 French conquest of Egypt, when Napoleon I claimed to eliminate the Mamluks.[26]

CONCLUSION

Undeniably, the twilight of majesty: Sultan Al-Asyraf Qansuh Al-Ghawri was a significant figure in the history of Mamluk. He brought the legacy of the Mamluks, even though he was accused to make some inappropriate changes during his reign which drove their empire to decline.

Nonetheless, as been mentioned before in this paper, “al-Ghawri has tried his best to maintain the stability of his government and administration. He was the innovator, but the ‘reviled’ one.[27] Might be, the condition and situation at his particular period enforces him to act and took some considerations in certain manner, made some people reviled him.”

His defeat in the Battle of Marj Dabiq 1516 was the indicator for the fallen of Mamluk empire which has lasted for about 10 centuries. However, the legacy, bravery and spirit of the Mamluks remained and inherited by Muslims throughout the ages.

CITED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Madden, Thomas F. (2005), Crusades the Illustrated History. 1st ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Petry, Carl F. (1994), Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans amd Egypt’s Waning As A Great Power, New York: State University

__________ . (1998), The Cambridge History of Egypt Vol. 1, Great Brittain: Cambridge University Press.

Richardson, Dan (2003). Rough Guide to Egypt, UK: Rough Guide.

Yalman, Suzan (2000). "The Art of the Mamluk Period (1250–1517)". In Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art

“Al-Ashraf Qansuh Al-Ghawry”, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=461252208

“Battle of Chāldirān.” (2011). In Encyclopedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/104688/Battle-of-Chaldiran

“Battle of Chaldiran”, The Islamic World to 1600, The University of Calgary (1998), The Applied History Research Group, http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/islam/empires/safavid/chaldiran.html

“Cairo” by Andre Raymond p.189 (http:// books.google.com/books?id=tdLALt9AbQQC& pg=PA189)

Firearms: a global history to 1700 by Kenneth Warren Chase (http://books.google.com/ books?id=esnWJkYRCJ4C& pg=PA104)

“Mamluk”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. (16 December 2011)

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=465552350

"Mamluk", The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2008. Encyclopedia.com. (December 18, 2011). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Mamluk.html

"Mamlūk." Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 2011. Web. 19 Dec. 2011. .

“Syria” (2011). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/578856/Syria

[1] Carl F. Petry (1994), Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans amd Egypt’s Waning As A Great Power, New York: State University, p. 1.

[2] “Mamluk”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. (16 December 2011) http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=465552350

[3] "Mamluk", The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2008. Encyclopedia.com. (December 18, 2011). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Mamluk.html

[4]Madden, Thomas F. Crusades the Illustrated History. 1st ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan P, 2005. 159

[5]http://books.google.com.tr/books?id=UgwFDQjo754C&pg=PA171&dq=kipchaks+turkic&hl=tr&ei=AHZeTPzBHsq6jAfmls3xAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

[6] Yalman, Suzan. "The Art of the Mamluk Period (1250–1517)". In Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–. http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/maml/hd_maml.htm (October 2001)

[7] Ibid.

[8] "Mamlūk." Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 2011. Web. 19 Dec. 2011. .

[9] Carl F. Petry (1998), The Cambridge History of Egypt Vol. 1, Great Brittain: Cambridge University Press, p. 494.

[10] Dan Richardson (2003), Rough Guide to Egypt, UK: Rough Guide, p. 149.

[11] Carl F. Petry (1998), p. 494.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Carl F. Petry (1994), p. 20.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Al-Ashraf Qansuh Al-Ghawry, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=461252208

[16] Ibid., p. 284.

[17] Ibid., p. 20.

[18] “Battle of Chāldirān.” (2011). In Encyclopedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/104688/Battle-of-Chaldiran

[19] Ibid.

[20] “Battle of Chaldiran”, The Islamic World to 1600, The University of Calgary (1998), The Applied History Research Group, http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/islam/empires/safavid/chaldiran.html

[21] Ibid.

[22] The Cambridge history of Egypt by M. W. Daly, Carl F. Petry p.498ff (http://books.google.com/ books?id=i0KYzOISv_4C& pg=PA498)

[23] Firearms: a global history to 1700 by Kenneth Warren Chase p.104 (http://books.google.com/ books?id=esnWJkYRCJ4C& pg=PA104)

[24] Prof. Kopanski several times raising this weirdness of mamluks in his lecture. Perhaps, the conflicts happened between Muslim great empire during that time cannot be seen simplistically. Rather, it was complex and complicated.

[25] “Syria” (2011). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/578856/Syria

[26] “Cairo” by Andre Raymond p.189 (http:// books.google.com/books?id=tdLALt9AbQQC& pg=PA189)

[27] Ibid., p. 20.

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